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RECENT DECISIONS
The holding in this case appears to be sound. Since the defen-
dants in this type of prosecution are on trial for tax evasion it would
be an undue burden to compel the government to prove not only the
crime charged, but also the likely taxable source from which the un-
reported income came. Once a discrepancy is shown to exist between
the taxpayer's increase in net worth and his reported income and the
government has negated all possible non-taxable sources, it is not
unjust that he be compelled to explain this discrepancy or remain
quiet at his peril. However, in clarifying the issue the Court leaves
unanswered the question of the limits to which the government must
go in negating possible sources of non-taxable income.
X
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-DoCTOR HELD LIABLE IN DAMAGES FOR
CANCEROPHOBIA.-Plaintiff was burned by X-ray treatments admin-
istered by defendants. Approximately two years later she consulted
a dermatologist, who treated the burns and advised a checkup every
six months because the burned area might become cancerous. The
New York Court of Appeals held that an award of $15,000 for the
mental anguish of cancerophobia resulting from the dermatologist's
advice was proper, as plaintiff's consultation with another doctor was
the natural result of defendant's negligence. Ferrara v. Galluchio,
5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
Responsibility for the ultimate results of negligent acts is a rec-
ognized principle of common law.1 The doctrine that the law looks
to the proximate and not the remote cause was embodied in legal
texts by Lord Bacon.2 Proximate cause has been defined as that
which naturally leads to and might be expected to directly produce
the result.3 Common sense has been the primary tool urged by courts
for determining the real, true cause of the damage. 4 Intervention by
doctors has been recognized as one of the natural and probable con-
' See Kilduff v. Kalinowski, 136 Conn. 305, 71 A.2d 593, 595 (1950). "If
one is negligent, he is liable for all the injurious consequences that flow from
his negligence, until diverted by the intervention of some efficient cause which
makes the injury its own.. . ." Ibid. See also Christianson v. Chicago, St. P.,
M. & 0. Ry., 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640, 641 (1896) ; Osborne v. Montgomery,
203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
2 "In jure non remota causa, sed proxima, spectatur. . . ." See Proximate
and Reinote Cause, 4 Am. L. Rv. 201-02 (1870). (All italicized in original.)
3 See State v. Manchester & Lawrence R.R., 52 N.H. 528, 552 (1873);
McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. 436, 442 (1866).
4 See Topsham v. Lisbon, 65 Me. 449, 462 (1876). See also Smethurst
v. Congregational Church, 148 Mass. 261, 12 Am. St. Rep. 550, 553-54 (1889) ;
Hoadley v. Northern Transp. Co., 115 Mass. 304, 15 Am. Rep. 106, 109 (1874).
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sequences of the negligent act. If such intervention increases the
injury, the original wrongdoer is held liable.'
In the oft-criticized decision, Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.,6 the New
York Court of Appeals stated its position on the compensability of
mental disturbances. Its doctrine that ". . . no recovery can be had
for injuries sustained by fright occasioned by the negligence of an-
other, where there is no immediate personal injury" 7 has never been
expressly overruled.8
An indication of a change in the court's attitude toward the
compensable nature of mental disturbances is evidenced in the.Ferrara
case by an extension of the chain of causality.9 The original wrong-
doer was held liable for the ultimate result of his negligent act, in
this case cancerophobia, a purely mental disturbance.' 0 That this
chain was not considered too tenuous is more surprising since this is
exactly the same court that reversed the Appellate Division and the
trial court on the issue of causality in Williams v. State." In the
Williams case, the court decided that the death of claimant's testator,
through fright occasioned by an escaped convict, was not the proxi-
mate result of the State's negligence in allowing the convict to escape
a few hours previously. 12
The shift in the court's attitude on recovery for psychic injury
is illustrated by a comparison of Comstock v. Wilson 13 with the
Ferrara case. In the former, the court affirmed the Mitchell doctrine
that there could be no recovery for psychic injury without some physi-
cal impact. This was based on the practical consideration that with-
out some slight impact the psychic injury cannot be anticipated, as
well as the danger of fraudulent claims.' 4  In the Ferrara case the
Court states that "freedom from mental disturbance is now a pro-
5 Milks v. Mclver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934); Sauter v. New
York Cent. & Hudson R.R., 66 N.Y. 50 (1876); Lyons v. Erie Ry., 57 N.Y.
489 (1874).
6 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
7Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355.
8 Sawyer v. Dougherty, 286 App. Div. 1061, 144 N.Y.S.2d 746 (3d Dep't
1955) (dictum) (mem. opinion).
9 "The employment of the dermatologist must be regarded as a natural
consequence of the original wrongdoer's tort. . . ." Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5
N.Y.2d 16, 20, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (1958).
10 Ferrara v. Galluchio, supra note 9. "The case is somewhat novel, of
course, in that it appears to be the first case in which a recovery has been
allowed against the original wrongdoer for purely mental suffering.
Ibid.
L11308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d 545 (1955).
12 Id. at 553, 127 N.E.2d at 548. It should be observed however that a pub-
lic policy concerning rehabilitation of criminal offenders was involved in this
case.
13257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931).
14 1d. at 238-39, 177 N.E. at 433.
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tected interest in this State." 'r Recognition is given to the fact that
many mental injuries are now capable of clear medical proof.16
It is interesting to note that the Court does not refer to any of
the established exceptions to the Mitchell doctrine in granting re-
covery.17 Rather, it emphasizes that the cancerophobia was the ulti-
mate result of a natural consequence of the defendant's negligence.' 8
It is submitted that recovery could have been allowed under the
Mitchell rule on a finding that X-rays are sufficiently similar to elec-
trical currents to constitute sufficient physical impact to allow recovery
for mental disturbance.' 9
The concern of the dissent over "so ready a road to the multi-
plication of damages" is warranted. However, the standard of medi-
cal proof required by the courts in future psychic injury cases will
determine the wisdom of the majority's decision. The immediate
effect of this case, a further recognition of the compensable nature of
mental injuries, is a good one. Fraudulent suitors, however, will
continue to be a danger, particularly in view of the apparently scant
psychiatric evidence offered at the trial of the Ferrara case.20
's Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d
996, 999 (1958).
26 In the principal case the examining neuropsychiatrist testified that the
plaintiff's ". . . thoughts were preoccupied in an obsessional manner and in
what we describe as a phobic or fearful manner with certain things that she
thought were going to happen to her as a result of the scar and burn which
she had on her shoulder." She was described as very tense, anxious and
apprehensive throughout the examination and ".... showed numerous physical
or somatic signs of this anxiety manifested by excessive sweating and coolness
of the palms of the hands, by a fine tremor of the outstretched hands and by
other signs of what we call general nervousness in terms of her speech, the
hesitancy of speech and so forth." Record, pp. 330-31.
17". .. [N]o recovery can be had for injuries sustained by fright occa-
sioned by the negligence of another, where there is no immediate personal
injury." Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 355(1896). For a complete discussion of this rule and its exceptions see McNiece,
Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1
(1949).
s ..... [LIater treatment by the dermatologist did not aggravate the physi-
cal injury inflicted by the original wrongdoers but, rather, increased only the
mental anguish attendant upon such injury. We perceive no sound reason for
drawing a distinction between the two situations." Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5
N.Y.2d 16, 20-21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (1958).
19 See Buckbee v. Third Ave. R.R., 64 App. Div. 360, 364, 72 N.Y.S. 217,
219-20 (2d Dep't 1901), where electrical current satisfied the physical contact
requirement.
20 The conclusion drawn from the examination [see note 16 szapra] of plain-
tiff's mental state was ". . . that she was suffering from the neuropsychiatric
viewpoint from a traumatic neurosis manifested chiefly by depression, that is,
by mood depression, by anxiety, by obsessionable thinking about this condition
and by what is described as severe cancerophobia, that is, the phobic apprehen-
sion that she would ultimately develop cancer in the site of the radiation burn."
Record, p. 332. Only one psychiatrist testified for the plaintiff. Record, p. 327.
The defendant introduced no psychiatric evidence.
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TORTS-RELEASE-LAW OF THE SITUS OF THE TORT DETER-
MINES EFFECT OF A RELEASE.-The defendant in a negligence action
moved to dismiss ' based on the defense of a general release, given
by plaintiff to a joint tort-feasor not a party to the action. Defendant
contended that, since the tort arose in Virginia, the laws of that state
controlled. Under Virginia law the general release is considered
absolute despite its reservation of plaintiff's rights against defendant.
Plaintiff maintained that the release, which was executed in New
York, was a covenant independent of the tort, affecting only the
remedy, and should therefore be governed by the law of the forum.
2
In granting defendant's motion, the Court held that the release was
substantive in nature since it effectively prevented the cause of action
from being enforced. De Bono v. Bittner, 178 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
At common law a release of one tort-feasor discharged all who
participated in the tort.3 It was reasoned that an injured party
should be allowed but one satisfaction for his claim. Since each joint
tort-feasor is considered to sanction the acts of the other, making
them his own, each becomes liable for the entire damage. Therefore,
a release or discharge of one joint tort-feasor extinguishes the entire
claim, leaving nothing for which the other can be held liable.4 The
New York courts escaped the harshness of the common-law rule by
holding that when a reservation of rights is contained in a written
release, the release must be treated as a covenant not to sue.5
Other jurisdictions resorted to various devices so that presently only
a few hold it is still impossible to settle with one tort-feasor without
releasing the other.6
1 N.Y. R. Cxv. PRAC. 106.
2 See GOODRicH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 227 (3d ed. 1949).
3 Cocke v. Jennor, Hob. 66, 80 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1614).
4 Roper v. Florida Pub. Util. Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938).
5 In New York, the release of one joint tort-feasor for consideration, with
a reservation of rights against the other joint tort-feasors, is considered a
covenant not to sue the tort-feasor so released, and does not operate to release
the others. However, in an action against the latter there is presented a ques-
tion of fact as to whether the amount received by the plaintiff in settlement
is payment in full for his injuries. If the facts disclose that the amount'so
received fully compensates the injured party there can be no further recovery,
but if the amount received does not fully compensate him he may recover
against the remaining joint tort-feasors for full damages, the amount of the
settlement being credited against the amount of the judgment See N.Y. DEaT.
& CRED. LAW §§ 231-35; Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903) ;
Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor Lines, 232 App. Div. 308, 249 N.Y. Supp. 623
(4th Dep't 1931), rev'd on other grounds, 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931).
6 See PRossER, TORTS 244 (2d ed. 1955). A covenant not to sue is treated
as a general release in Pennsylvania and Virginia. See Smith v. Roydhouse,
Arey & Co., 244 Pa. 474, 90 Atl. 919 (1914); Shortt v. Hudson Supply &
Equip. Co., 191 Va. 306, 60 S.E.2d 900 (1950). Washington, which had
formerly rejected the covenant not to sue in Rust v. Schlaitzer, 175 Wash.
331, 27 P.2d 571 (1933), and Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wash. 2d 310, 111 P.2d
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A covenant not to sue does not discharge the cause of action,
but is merely an agreement not to enforce it against the covenantee.
7
Thus, a covenant with one tort-feasor does not bar an action against
another jointly and severally liable, although the amount paid by the
covenantee will be taken into account in such an action.8 In order
to prevent circuity of action, the covenant not to sue may be pleaded
as a defense.9
The instant case raises the problem as to the effect that should
be given to a release in New York, which recognizes covenants
not to sue, if the tort arose in a jurisdiction which holds that a cove-
nant not to sue one joint tort-feasor operates to prevent a recovery
against any other tort-feasor who participated in the same breach of
duty.
The leading cases have treated the question along well-settled
principles of conflict of laws.10 An extensive discussion is found in
Goldstein v. Gilbert," where the precise situation presented in the
instant case was before the court in West Virginia. 2  The court
stated:
We think it is well settled that the plaintiff's right of substantive recovery
is the law, both prospective and retroactive, of the sovereignty of the place
that the accident took place. Its birth and continued existence depend upon that
law, and, if that be true, it would seem to follow logically that the legal effect
of any conduct which might or might not terminate that existence would
necessarily be weighed in accordance with the same law.' 3
This reasoning was adopted in Preine v. Freeman,1 4 which reached
the conclusion that the laws of the state which gave the plaintiff the
cause of action also control in determining the effect of the release,
regardless of where the release was executed. Again, in Lindsay v.
1003 (1941), appears to have impliedly accepted it in Richardson v. Pacific
Power & Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1941).
7 Kansas City So. Ry. v. McDaniel, 131 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1942).
s Southern Pac. Co. v. Raish, 205 F.2d 389, 393 (9th Cir. 1953) ; McKenna
v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943). See note 5 supra.
9 Karcher v. Burbank, 303 Mass. 303, 21 N.E.2d 542 (1939).10 It is a general rule that the lex loci delicti governs the right of an in-
jured party to sue in tort, the liability of the tort-feasor, and the defenses he
may plead. The liability to pay damages for a wrong may, after it has come
into existence, be discharged or modified by the law of the state which
created it. See 2 BEAL, CONFLIcT OF LAws § 389.1 (1935) ; GOODRICH, CoN-
FLicr OF LAws § 92 (3d ed. 1949) ; MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 196 (1901).
11 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606 (1942).
12 In West Virginia, releases in tort actions are governed by statute. "A
release to, or an accord and satisfaction with, one or more joint trespassers,
or tortfeasors, shall not inure to the benefit of another such trespasser, or
tortfeasor, and shall be no bar to an action or suit against such other joint
trespasser, or tortfeasor, for the same cause of action to which the release or
accord and satisfaction relates." W. VA. CoD- ANN. § 5481 (1955).
13 Goldstein v. Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1942).
24 112 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Va. 1953).
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Chicago, B. & Q.R.R.,15 speaking of a release, the court said, "its
validity as a defense in an action in tort is governed by the law of
the place of injury." 16 Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
held that the effect of a release in tort is ". . . properly determined
by the law controlling the discharge of the obligation sought to be
released." 17
In the principal case, plaintiff, in an attempt to avoid application
of the Virginia law, contended that the instrument was separate and
distinct from the tort, affecting only the remedy. The courts have
rejected this theory, holding that the ". . . contract is by its terms
tied to the tort, and the same law should be applied to the one as
to the other" 18 and that ". . . a right without [a] remedy is hardly
a working hypothesis." 19 In the Goldstein case, the court conceded
that a covenant not to sue seems only to affect the remedy, but felt
bound to follow the law of Virginia.20
It would appear that the initial position taken by New York is
perfectly consistent with that taken in other jurisdictions. No other
position is tenable if the law of the situs of the tort is to govern both
the creation and the extent of the tort-feasor's liability. Injured
persons and their counsel must heed the New York interpretation
when confronted with causes of action that arose in Pennsylvania or
Virginia, else they may, by covenanting not to sue one of several
joint tort-feasors, inadvertently settle a claim for less than its proper
value.
15226 Fed. 23 (7th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 678 (1916).
16 Id. at 26.
17 Daily v. Somberg, 49 N.J. Super. 469, 140 A.2d 429, 432 (1958). The
court said: "The law that creates the right determines what items of loss are
to be included in the damages. Since the right to damages is created by the
law of Ohio, it is measured by that law .... The law of Ohio controls not
only in ascertaining the damages that proximately resulted from the injury
sustained there, but also in determining the legal effect of the instrument re-
leasing plaintiff's claim for such damages." Ibid.
18 Smith v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 194 Fed. 79, 81 (8th Cir. 1912).
19 McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1943). The plaintiff
urged that the instrument in question was not a release from substantive lia-
bility but was merely a covenant not to sue. In refusing to accept the dis-
tinction the court said: "When one surrenders all means of enforcing his
claim against another and does this in settlement of a dispute and threatened
litigation, he effectually extinguishes the underlying right. Thereafter, if it
is right at all, it is right without remedy. . . . [T]he idea of right without
remedy is hardly a working hypothesis. Every day law is predicated upon
the courts' capacity to do something about disputes. When one wholly sur-
renders his recourse to the courts in such matters he insulates his adversary
against his claim as effectually as when in so many words he releases him."
Ibid.
20 "There is no question but that under most of the cases involving the
distinction, the difference has been upheld with the result that while its [the
covenant not to sue] practical effect is to bar the signer's right of recovery,
it can still be said that the contract itself relates only to the remedy." Goldstein
v. Gilbert, 125 W. Va. 250, 23 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1942).
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WILLS-INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE-INCORPORATION OF AN
IMMATERIALLY AMENDED TRUST ALLOwED.-Testator made a be-
quest to the trustees of an amendable trust. Subsequently, the trust
was amended twice. The bequest was attacked as being in violation
of the rule against incorporation by reference. In unanimously affirm-
ing the decisions of the Surrogate and the Appellate Division, the
Court of Appeals held that a bequest, referring to a trust in which
minor administrative changes had been made subsequent to the execu-
tion of the will, did not offend the rule. In re Ivie's Will, 4 N.Y.2d
178, 149 N.E.2d 725, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1958).
A devise or bequest is ordinarily invalid unless it is in writing,
subscribed and attested in the manner provided by statute.' The
doctrine of incorporation by reference, recognized in England 2 and
in many states,3 allows an instrument, whether or not it meets these
requirements, to be incorporated into a will merely by making refer-
ence to it.4 However, the testator's intent to incorporate must be
certain r and the instrument must be in existence at the time the will
is executed. 6 It must also be precisely and adequately defined therein.7
Because of the danger of fraud 8 and circumvention of the statute of
wills,9 courts employ extreme care in their application of the doctrine.
I See, e.g., N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 21.
2 See Bizzey v. Flight, [1876] 3 Ch. D. 269; Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moore
P.C. 427, 14 Eng. Rep. 757 (1858).
3 See, e.g., Newhall v. Newhall, 280 Ill. 199, 117 N.E. 476 (1917) ; Shulsky
v. Shulsky, 98 Kan. 69, 157 Pac. 407 (1916) ; Taft v. Stearns, 234 Mass. 273,
125 N.E. 570 (1920).
4 See ATKINSON, WIu.s 385-94 (2d ed. 1953) ; 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 54.1 (2d
ed. 1956).
See Matter of Piffard, 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888); In re
McCurdy's Estate, 197 Cal. 276, 240 Pac. 498 (1925).
6 See Estate of Shillaber, 74 Cal. 144, 15 Pac. 453 (1887); Appeal of
Sleeper, 129 Me. 194, 151 AtI. 150 (1930) (dictum).
7 See Thayer v. Wellington, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 283 (1864); Sheldon v.
Sheldon, 1 Rob. Ecc. 82, 163 Eng. Rep. 972 (1844). For a general discussion
of the conditions in relation to trusts, see 1 Scott, TRUSTS § 54.1 (2d ed. 1956).
See also 1 PAGF, WILLS §242 (lifetime ed. 1901) for a discussion of the dis-
tinction between incorporation by reference and the doctrine that a will may
be written on separate pieces of paper.
8 "Obviously an unrestricted recognition of incorporation of unattested
papers into wills would open the door to fraud and in addition may be said
to violate the spirit of the requirements of execution." ATKINSON, WIu.S
386 (2d ed. 1953). However, even without the aid of the doctrine, courts go
outside the will. See, e.g., Dennis v. Holsopple, 148 Ind. 297, 47 N.E. 631
(1897), allowing a bequest to persons who might have nursed and clothed
testator when he was in need; Metcalf v. Sweeney, 17 R.I. 213, 21 Atl. 364
(1891), determining whether plaintiff was within a bequest to servants in
testator's employ at his death. Similarly an invalid will may be incorporated
by a subsequently executed valid will, although New York limits this doctrine
largely to cases in which the original will was invalid for reason of lack of
testamentary capacity. In re Brown's Estate, 6 M.2d 803, 160 N.Y.S.2d 761
(Surr. Ct. 1957).
9 See Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 Atl. 1058 (1907); Philps v.
1958]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In New York, when the instrument itself meets the statutory
requirements it may properly be incorporated.' ° The courts will
also go outside the will merely to explain a term in the will." In
at least one case the court went outside the will to determine the
amount of the bequest.1 2  This would appear to be a recognition of
the doctrine of "independent significance." Although it is said that
the doctrine of incorporation by reference is not recognized,13 non-
recognition will not be carried to a "drily logical extreme." 14
Apparently the courts Will sometimes 15 allow incorporation if by so
doing the obvious intent of the testator will be effected. Matter of
Rausch 16 established that an unamendable trust may be incorporated
by reference.' 7 The ultimate basis for that decision is not clear. In
the opinion, Judge Cardozo stated:
Here the extrinsic fact, identifying and explaining the gift already made, is
as impersonal and enduring as the inscription on a monument....
A father bequeaths a legacy to his son by cancelling whatever indebtedness
appears upon his books. No one doubts the validity of such a gift .... Yet
to understand the extent of the legacy we must go beyond the will itself.
"Signs and symbols" must be turned "into their equivalent realities .... ,-18
This language appears to approximate the "independent significance"
doctrine. The opinion goes on to state that "the rule against incor-
poration is not a doctrinaire demand for an unattainable perfection." 19
It would appear that the doctrine of incorporation by reference or
that of "independent significance" could support the decision.
Robbins, 40 Conn. 250, 271-72 (1873); Note, 17 MINN. L. REv. 527, 533-38
(1933); 12 MiNx. L. REV. 769, 770 (1928); AxrKisoN, WILLS 386 (2d ed.
1953).
10 The most common example of this is the incorporation by reference of
another's will. See Matter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918).
"I See In. re Latz' Estate, 95 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Surr. Ct. 1950) ; In re Utter's
Will, 173 Misc. 1069, 20 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
12 Langdon v. Astor's Executors, 16 N.Y. 9 (1857).
13 See DAVID, N.Y. LAw OF WILLS § 436 (1923). "The New York law is
well established that documents or instruments which have not been executed
in accordance with the requirements of section 21 of the Decedent Estate Law
cannot be incorporated in a will by reference." In re Snyder's Will, 125
N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (Surr. Ct. 1953). For an earlier case in New York, see
Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 238 (1891). But see Caulfield
v. Sullivan, 85 N.Y. 153 (1881); Brown v. Clark, 77 N.Y. 369 (1879).
14 Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 331, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932). Mr.
Justice Holmes originated the phrase in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S.
104, 110 (1911).
15 See notes 5, 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
16 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
17 Although this is accepted as the holding of the case, nowhere in the opin-
ion does Judge Cardozo mention that the trust is unamendable. However, that
it is unamendable is shown in President & Directors of the Manhattan Co.
v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940), and In re
Snyder's Will, 125 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
1s Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 332, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932).
19 Id. at 332, 179 N.E. at 757.
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In the subsequent case of President and Directors of the Man-
hattan Co. v. JanowitZ,20 a bequest to a trust which had been substan-
tially amended subsequent to the execution of the will was not allowed.
The court stated that the substantial change by amendment eliminated
all independent significance. However, despite amendment, it would
seem that the trust still had independent significance, 2' and there-
fore, if the underlying concept of the Rausch case was "independent
significance," the Janowitz case would be difficult to reconcile. Sub-
sequently, Janowitz was refined by In re Snyder's Will,22 where a
bequest was allowed to an amendable trust which actually had not
been amended after execution of the will. Once again, the conclusion
can be sustained under either doctrine.
In extending the Snyder case, the principal case affirms it. Since
the amendment was found immaterial, it is not within Janowitz' rule.
The Court of Appeals, however, would also seem to have tacitly ac-
cepted Janowitz, since the principal case could have been more easily
decided if the Court had chosen to overrule it. Thus, in New York
today, a trust that is unamendable, or one that is amendable but in
fact has not subsequently been amended, may be incorporated. One
which is subsequently substantially amended may not be; one that is
immaterially changed may be. Just where the line is to be drawn is
left unanswered.
No valid reason seems to exist for these distinctions. The rea-
sons for upholding incorporation in one case uphold it in all. If
the intent of the testator is certain and the possibility of fraud is
eliminated, the incorporation of all formal trust instruments should
be allowed. Certainly with the solemnity surrounding this type of
trust there is virtually no chance of fraud. As Judge Cardozo in-
dicated, little difference exists between leaving money to a trustee
who is bound by the trust agreement, and leaving money to a cor-
poration which is bound by its corporate charter. Yet one would
hardly doubt the validity of a bequest to a corporation, although a
corporation may subsequently have its corporate charter amended.23
20 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940).2 1 This situation seems analogous to a bequest to employees at death. There
the bequest is allowed despite the fact that the identity of the employees might
have changed between the making of the will and the death of the testator.
See Dennis v. Holsopple, 148 Ind. 297, 47 N.E. 631 (1897). Likewise a gift
to a corporation will be allowed although its charter may be substantially
changed. See Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 331, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932)
(dictum).
22 125 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
23 In both instances there is legal obligation to use the money according to
either the trust agreement or the corporate charter. See Matter of Rausch,
258 N.Y. 327, 331, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932). For general discussions of the
Rausch case, see Notes, 17 MIN. L. Rzv. 527 (1933), 6 U. CINN. L. REv. 295
(1932); 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 507 (1932); 7 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 541 (1932).
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